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The Saltwater Theory: A Directed Study of Failed Revolutions 
James Gulliksen 
On an unusually warm evening of December 31st, 1958, Cuban President Fulgencio Batista 
attended a New Year’s Eve party in Havana. President Batista spent his time at the party enjoying 
the company of those most loyal to him, and informing a few of them that he would be leaving the 
island later that night. The Castro uprising, he told them, had developed over the prior two years 
from sporadic attacks on his security units in the southern mountains of the island into a popular 
offensive on central urban provinces. Just before the party, President Batista was issued an update 
of the current state of the uprising: Che Guevara’s forces would soon control Santa Clara. Batista 
knew his time as president was over, and after the party he boarded a flight at 3 o’clock in the 
morning destined for the Dominican Republic along with $350 million and a few dozen friends 
and family. Meanwhile, 162 miles away, Che Guevara continued his surge into Santa Clara. Upon 
assuming control of the city on January 1st, 1959, Che and Fidel learned of Batista’s departure; 
Havana was theirs – the revolution had triumphed.1 
The Changing Study of Revolution 
Successful insurrections, such as in Cuba, offer valuable insight to those who pursue the 
study of rapid (and often violent) political change within states. In 1938, Dr. Crane Brinton began 
the modern academic field of revolutions with his classic study on the uniformities of revolutions. 
Brinton focused on the conditions that allowed revolutions to occur and the stages that occurred in 
several massive political uprisings, culminating in a structure he theorized future revolutions must 
follow.2 As the study of political change progressed, social scientists began a pivot to focusing on 
actors in uprisings rather than the conditions of the state. In their eyes, the actors (revolutionaries, 
political parties, foreign nations) within a sphere decide a path for political change, rather than the 
existing conditions (political rights, economic conditions, repression, etc.) in the same 
environment.3 This essay will instead counter this thinking by introducing a Saltwater Theory to 
explain how different forms of uprisings (the same as different species of animals) can survive in 
some environments but not others. Additionally, it will serve as an inverse to Brinton’s study of 
four classical revolutions by examining four failed revolutions: the Simba Rebellion beginning in 
1964, the First Palestinian Intifada beginning in 1987, the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, and 
the Syrian uprising beginning in 2011. As Che Guevara himself wrote, “Victory is a great source 
of positive experiences, but so is defeat.”4 
The pivot to actors holds merit: revolutions in virtually every case are a David versus 
Goliath matchup, which aligns them with the vast prism of asymmetric conflict. As social scientists 
of asymmetry have found in determining outcome, the strategy of the weaker force in such conflict 
is enormously more important than the strategy of the stronger force.5 After all, sports coaches and 
managers aren’t bothered by the strategy of George Foreman in his upset loss to Muhammad Ali 
in 1974, nor the strategy of the St. Louis Rams in their shocking Super Bowl loss to the New 
England Patriots in 2002. Instead, the significance of those upsets lies in the audacious strategies 
of the winning underdogs: a confident, quick-footed Muhammad Ali or a doggedly focused Tom 
Brady. Likewise, the key decisions and strategies employed by those initiating a revolution are 
more significant to the study of revolutions than the strategies implemented by the Old Regimes. 
The problem with the pivot to an actor-focused model of revolution is the resulting 
disregard for existing conditions of a state or Old Regime. Global academics and policymakers 
who once heralded the “misery breeds revolt” theory of revolution eventually discounted it, then 
dismissed it, then forgot it. In truth, “misery breeds revolt” is a simplistic observation which can 
be discounted by acknowledging the poor but stable states of the world, as there are plenty. 
However, the present paradigm has wandered too far by focusing heavily on the actions of 
revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, but ignoring how an environment becomes conducive 
or resistant to revolution. The relationship itself between an actor’s behavior and the environment, 
rather than simply one or the other, is the most telling sign of whether a revolution will begin, 
succeed, or fail. 
First, a return to Havana. After successfully overthrowing the Batista regime and beginning 
a new political system in Cuba, Che Guevara embarked on a worldwide tour in the summer of 
1959. Foreign crowds celebrated Che as an international revolutionary icon – a status he still holds 
even after death. Guevara traveled throughout the Arab World, Europe and Asia in an effort to 
bolster Cuba’s status abroad and study foreign revolutions. Eventually, after returning to Cuba, 
Guevara’s location became unknown to the international community after he fell off the grid in an 
effort to export his vision for revolution around the world.4 To the actor-focused theorists of 
revolutions, the most successful revolutionary alive traveling across the world to export revolution 
is as close to apocalypse as it gets. After all, they saw revolutions succeeding as a result of 
universally successful strategies of the revolutionary. However, as Guevara traveled to Africa and 
later South America, his failures were paramount. The natural question arises: how, after 
participating in such a successful overthrow of the regime in Cuba, did Guevara attempt the same 
thing elsewhere with extreme disaster? A fitting comparison to the differences in state 
environments is differences in the environments of animals. Che Guevara, like many revolutionary 
theorists today, thought that if uprisings were fish, you can take them from one place, put them in 
another, and let them swim. They fail to realize that fish themselves cannot swim in any water. 
Fish swim in either freshwater or saltwater, typically without survivability in the other. In 
modern history, Guevara was the first person to take a “freshwater fish” per se – the Cuban 
Revolution – and release it in saltwater – Congo – leading the fish to eventual death. In other words, 
revolutions never take place in a vacuum. Every action taken by an actor is within a prism which 
affects the environment to make it either more or less conducive to revolution. The following 
studies illustrate how the strategies employed by several uprisings, though inspired by previous, 
“freshwater” revolutions, could not survive in the “saltwater” environment. 
Congo: The beginning of Che's collapse 
Africa, to Che Guevara, was the perfect arena to spur revolution. He saw the continent’s 
decolonization as merely a geopolitical shift without many practical implications for the peasant 
class who represented the majority of sub-Saharan Africans. Decolonization was an opportunity 
for real change though, and in Marxist fashion, his rhetoric outlined that opportunity. The 
sovereignty of the Africans, he argued, was in a transition from direct colonial control to a more 
subtle (but equally harmful) bourgeoisie control; one in which “Yankee imperialism” minimized 
the liberty of Africa as a whole.6 It was his duty to bring rural guerilla warfare to Congo which 
would ignite the continent in proletariat revolution. 
In 1965, Che arrived in Congo with an optimistic band of about 200 Cuban soldiers 
determined to “Cubanize” the 
Simba (lion) group of Congolese 
rebels and overthrow the American-
supported Congolese government 
of Joseph Kasavubu. Guevara 
recounted stories from his time in 
Congo in a series of journal entries 
and letters to Fidel Castro. The first 
line of his recollection reads, “This 
is the history of a failure.”4 While 
his humility is certainly admirable, 
he is also correct. From the moment Guevara arrived in Congo, he saw nothing but failure in his 
attempts to replicate the Cuban Revolution across the Atlantic Ocean. 
Most primarily, the Cubans found the Simba Rebellion in Congo to have no resemblance 
to a proletariat struggle. Rather than the peasant uprising of Guevara’s vision that could be 
supplemented by guerilla warfare, opposing tribes and their warlords were fighting for their own 
piece of the pie; while ready to fight, they were largely disinterested in the Marxist vision of a 
peasant overthrow. Furthermore, the warlords and tribal leaders in Congo were largely 
unprofessional. He was furious about their frivolous use of revolutionary funding (primarily from 
Cuba and the Soviet Union) on their own indulgence in booze and prostitutes.7 In a candid letter 
to Fidel Castro in May of 1965, Che quipped, “Not a cent will reach a front where the peasants 
suffer every misery you can imagine, including the rapaciousness of their own protectors … [Even 
though] whisky and women are not on the list of expenses covered by friendly governments, they 
cost a lot if you want quality.”4 
Finally, Guevara found the Congolese rebels (and his own men, to a lesser extent) to be 
particularly pathetic fighters. He wrote extensively about men dropping their weapons and fleeing 
skirmishes, often never to be seen again. He even theorized an ongoing “Congolization” of his 
Cuban forces, as they became lazier and increasingly apathetic as 1965 came to a close.4 By 
November, Guevara’s only concern was leaving the country. Eventually Guevara and his Cuban 
forces evacuated the DRC just north of Kelemie in the east across the lake to Tanzania, before 
returning to the Americas. By the time the Cuban revolutionaries left, the Simba Rebellion was 
crushed and the Simbas themselves were left abandoned to a hostile government.7 
 While Guevara’s and other historians’ account of the Cuban intervention in Congo are 
insightful, they often omit a simple fact: the Congo isn’t Cuba. Explanations of Guevara’s failure 
align with either, one: the actor-centric model, that the Simbas in Congo (even with Che) were not 
able to stage a successful revolution, or two: the state-centric model, that Congo was an 
environment that was protected from revolution. In truth, the explanation rests in the relationship 
between the actors and the state. Che Guevara assumed that since his revolution was so successful 
in Cuba, it must also be successful in Congo. He failed to account for the environment which 
allowed him success in Cuba: national cohesion, combinations of rural and guerilla warfare, and a 
common cause. These are qualities of an environment that he did not enjoy in the Congo: tribal 
identities and European miscalculation of borders made national cohesion impossible, the 
Congolese government’s overwhelming presence made guerilla warfare more direct, and warring 
factions had no chance of forming a common cause. 
 A surveyor of Che’s transition from Cuba to Congo may fittingly ask, “If Guevara 
experienced so much trouble sparking revolution in Congo, what is to say the environment did not 
allow for revolution at all?” This is where Congo is an extremely special case, as in addition to 
dispelling the actor-focused model of analyzing revolution, it also dispels the rigidity of the state-
focused model. Three decades after Guevara’s failure in Congo, the government he fought against 
was overthrown by Laurent Kabila, a Simba rebel who had fought alongside Che himself (Guevara 
even recounted how unimpressed he was with Kabila during the 1960s uprising).4 Of course, 
elements of an environment can certainly change over a period of thirty years, but the quickness 
of Kabila’s insurgency speaks to the lack of mechanisms possible for a state to consider themselves 
fully immune to revolution. 
Palestine: An uneasy shift to violence 
 1986 and 1987 saw steep escalations in tension between Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and 
the Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip. A series 
of attacks by Palestinians and retaliatory repression by the Israelis escalated the tension and 
eventually led to calls for an intifada (literally Arabic for ‘shake off,’ but has come to mean an 
uprising). By November 1987, several nonviolent youth demonstrations began to mobilize 
resistance against the Israeli occupying forces. Protests 
soon transitioned into more organized demonstrations, 
which included blocking roads, throwing rocks and 
burning tires. While the demonstrations became more 
aggressive, they remained nonviolent as cadres of 
Palestinians targeted Israeli resources and public 
sentiment rather than lives.8 This stage of the intifada 
was hugely popular among Palestinians, who found an 
obligation to participate, and demands were outlined: 
the withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as well as expanded rights for Palestinians, 
primarily by the abolishment of curfews and 
checkpoints. The former of these demands is especially 
significant as it represents a concession by Palestinians 
to liberation in the territories rather than the entirety of 
historic Palestine, “from the river to the sea.”9 By 1989, 
the intifada had become violent, as car bombs and 
Molotov cocktails became more notable than boycotts, sabotages and strikes. In 1993, the first 
Oslo Accord was signed, effectively ending the First Intifada. 
In an historical sense, Palestine had two major directing actors in the 1980s, together 
working in semi-functional harmony. First, local factions in the Palestinian Territories pursued the 
resident Palestinian causes: protection from repression, ensuring mobility rights, performing 
administrative functions and more. The supplement to the local factions was the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), the self-identified overarching governing body of the territories. 
The PLO, as a result of exile to Tunisia, had a much broader mission which focused on the holistic 
advancement of the Palestinian cause.10 Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO, had a distinct grand 
vision for that advancement: bringing the South African strategy to Palestine. Specifically, Arafat 
saw the resistance to apartheid by leaders such as Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela and found 
parallels to the Palestinian experience. In 1988, the African National Congress (ANC) validated 
Arafat by issuing several statements condemning the Israeli government and likening the 
environment in the Palestinian Territories to apartheid-era South Africa.11 
In the more practical setting of the 1987 uprising, local leaders organized the initial 
demonstrations, taking the PLO off guard. The PLO, even from Tunisia, saw themselves as the 
sole governing body of Palestine and seized control of the intifada in order to substitute their own 
vision into the uprising. PLO leaders opined that only the PLO had the resources and knowledge 
necessary to direct a large-scale resistance movement.12 
The most influential leader of the uprising once the weight shifted to the PLO was Khalil 
al-Wazir, more commonly known as Abu Jihad (meaning Father of Struggle; not to be confused 
with Jihadism, as al-Wazir was an enemy of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group). Abu Jihad was 
appointed by Yasser Arafat to be the PLO’s orchestrator of the intifada and he made certain to 
advance Arafat’s agenda to replicate the South African model of liberation. An important (and 
somewhat ironic) caveat is that only after Abu Jihad was assassinated by Israeli intelligence forces 
in April 1988 did the intifada become violent. 
The replication of South African strategy in the intifada explains two things: One, the 
newfound strategy of aggression through nonviolence by the PLO in 1987, and two, the PLO’s 
willingness to negotiate at Oslo. Nonviolence was not a staple of the PLO before or after the First 
Intifada, prompting the group’s addition to some international terror lists in the 1980s. Further, 
several sabotage strategies employed by the Palestinians such as the bombing of empty vehicles 
and burning tires were identical strategies advocated by Mandela prior to his imprisonment and 
used by the ANC. The willingness to participate in the Oslo Accords, despite Palestinian 
pessimism on any negotiation’s outcome, represents the PLO’s diversion from drawing inspiration 
from South African liberation to attempting to replicate it. 
From the PLO’s holistic vision for a South African-esque agenda for the Territories, the 
intifada was a success. Just as Arafat had hoped, much of the same international activism spent on 
Mandela and the abolition of South African apartheid was spent on Palestine in the 1990s. In fact, 
in 1990, just two weeks after his release from prison, Nelson Mandela made his first journey 
outside of South Africa to greet Yasser Arafat and offer his support to the Palestinian plight.13 
From a practical view of the political system of the Palestinian Territories, however, the intifada 
was certainly a failed revolution. While Palestinians did not gain new political or social rights as 
a result of the revolution, many argue that rights constricted after 1993, causing the Second Intifada 
in 2000. Indeed, as new Israeli settlements sprouted and expanded in the West Bank after Oslo, 
homes were increasingly demolished, and the Israeli government established more organized 
methods of Palestinian repression. While debate ensues over the lasting ramifications of the First 
Intifada, perhaps an equally fitting question surrounds the viability of the South African liberation 
model in Palestine. Apartheid in South Africa was relatively (and quite literally) black and white. 
Could a duplicate strategy have been able to garner world attention based on parallels between the 
white over black experience and the (mostly) Euro-Jew over Arab experience? Herein lies the 
difficulty in taking the “revolutionary fish” from one environment to another. 
China: The swift silencing of idealism 
 While the intifada ensued in Israel-Palestine, the Cold War was coming to a close in the 
rest of the international community. As the Soviet Union underwent economic liberalization and 
political reform, Moscow’s sphere of influenced lessened each year. Eastern European states began 
to break away from Soviet control, contributing to the collapse of the communist alliance system 
in the late 1980s. As states became increasingly democratic, western political scientists became 
validated in their long-held theory that if economic liberalization takes place (via privatization, 
removal of controls and opening of markets), political liberalization will inevitably follow.14 Their 
theory held true in every state that had so far embraced democracy and political rights since the 
same countries had begun economic liberalization just a few years prior. 
 The outlier to these assumptions, up to 1989, was China. Since a decade prior, the Chinese 
government in Beijing had been intensely involved in a campaign entitled “Economic Reform and 
Opening.” From the Chinese Revolution in 1949 until Deng Xiaoping’s reign beginning in 1978, 
the Chinese economy was plagued by economic underperformance resulting in famine and stalled 
growth. As a direct result, and as the name suggests, Beijing began economic reforms beginning 
with privatization of industry and the opening of markets by promoting foreign investment in 
China.15 The west waited patiently, and no political liberalization came. Finally, in 1989, the 
western theorists began to think their final validation had arrived as the trend of economic 
liberalization brought the first challenge of political liberalization to Beijing. The death of Chinese 
reformist Hu Yaobang led massive groups of students to protest the Chinese government in mid-
April 1989. They feared the imminent dismissal of Hu’s lifelong work of eliminating corruption 
in the communist party. 
At first, the Chinese government attempted to cooperate with the students. Though the 
government never addressed the student calls for a more democratic government, moderates such 
as Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang promised to prioritize ending corruption. Shortly thereafter, about 
a hundred students stage a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square, the famous revolutionary square of 
Mao Zedong. To their delight, thousands more students participate in a sit-in to occupy the square. 
The students draft a series of grievances against the government and a set of solutions that 
primarily called for an end to corruption, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. At this 
point, the government grew hostile to the demonstrators and the protests gathered more support. 
On May 17, the protests reached their peak: 1.2 million demonstrators marched on Beijing, along 
with smaller protests in 400 cities across China mainland. Later in May, 1.5 million demonstrators 
marched through the streets of Hong Kong, demanding political rights for all Chinese. By this time, 
the movement had transitioned from purely student-run and organized to a massive grassroots 
campaign that included laborers, police officers, and even party officials.16 
 On May 20, the Chinese government declared martial law, and the military was deployed 
across the country to put down protests. In Beijing, the military moved into the city from every 
direction toward the revolutionary square. As they neared Tiananmen, scores of demonstrators 
blocked the military, who quickly opened fire. Several protestors were shot and chaos ensued, as 
the demonstrators, along with the international community, did not expect such heavy force from 
the Chinese military.16 As the summer progressed, the military was met with little resistance and 
the protests were successfully eliminated. 
 From virtually every perspective, the Tiananmen Square protests were a failure. Student 
activists had organized a campaign to march on Beijing until reforms were pursued with the 
strength of a million, only to be crushed in a short month. While several student groups had 
different agendas at Tienanmen, historians have found from activist leaders that the approaches of 
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr to be the most predominant strategies employed by 
the demonstrators.17 The strategies are certainly evident: hunger strikes, sit-ins, and written pleas 
are classic civil disobedience practices employed by both Gandhi and King. Here again, the debate 
on uprising rages on: while some say China in 1989 was resistant to revolution, others insist 
underlying faults in the strategy of the demonstrators did not live up to those of Gandhi and King. 
The latter point here is especially weak, since demonstrators in China followed Gandhi and King’s 
strategy almost verbatim. The only real difference is the lack of a central icon (perhaps with the 
exception of the Tank Man, who 
anonymously stopped a line of tanks 
approaching the square, pictured here). 
Here again, reality suggests the answer 
is somewhere in the relationship. It is 
not a contradiction to accept that China 
was hardly impervious to revolution 
while also accepting that the 
demonstrators did everything they could 
with the strategy they employed. The 
problem is, China wasn’t colonial India or Civil Rights Era United States. China had deep-seated 
institutions which prioritized a maintenance of the status quo over popular decision-making. 
Current evidence seems to suggest that despite China being vulnerable to some forms of uprising, 
perhaps indirect guerilla warfare, even King or Gandhi would have failed in Beijing in 1989. 
Syria: An uprising spirals downward 
 Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, western focus slowly 
shifted to the Arab World. Many leaders of Arab states were remnants of Cold War backing by the 
United States, despite their authoritarian statuses and tendencies toward oppression. Just as 
American policymakers began to rethink their policies toward the de facto subsidizing of 
dictatorship, the attacks on September 11th, 2001 reinvigorated a commitment for stability in Arab 
states, even at the expense of democracy. As a result, decision-makers of the west saw it in their 
interest to turn a blind eye to dictatorship in the Arab World, because they represented a lesser evil 
than Jihadist extremism. A decade later, citizens of the Arab World attempted to prove to the 
world’s hegemons that the choice between brutal dictators and brutal terrorists was a false 
dichotomy.18 
 Beginning in 2011 with Tunisia, then Egypt, then Libya, a wave of uprisings overwhelmed 
North African governments and began to spread into the Near East. In addition to Bahrain and 
Yemen, the Syrian government headed by Bashar al-Assad (himself a remnant of Cold War 
dictatorship) was quickly faced with spontaneous protests. Tech-savvy millennials took to social 
media in hopes of organizing protests to address Assad’s brutality and call for economic relief in 
the wake of a massive Syrian drought. Though they originally failed to garner mobility, the 
prospect of an uprising in Syria seemed increasingly likely as the earlier Arab uprisings were 
watched by a famine-exhausted Syrian populace. In early March, just a month after the overthrow 
of governments in Tunisia and Egypt, Assad’s forces arrested several schoolboys and girls aged 
10-15 for writing a slogan of the Egyptian revolution on a city wall in Daraa. The parents, after 
learning of their children being tortured and imprisoned, took to the streets in protest. In a 
Tiananmen-esque flex of muscle, Assad’s forces shot and killed the children’s parents as they 
demonstrated. The following day, March 24, 2011, twenty thousand Syrians attended the parent’s 
funerals in protest of Assad’s brutality.18 Reconciliation between Assad and the protestors proved 
impossible, and uprisings against the Assad Regime began in urban areas across western Syria. 
Slowly but surely, Assad reduced his reconciliatory tone and replaced it with intention to crush the 
protests. By the summer of 2011 Assad’s forces had occupied hotspot cities and defectors from his 
military had formed several armed groups to oppose him, most notably the Free Syrian Army. 
Chaos in Syria allowed for the initial 
success of the Islamic State terrorist 
organization, who gained a foothold in 
rural areas in the east. 
By 2016 – five years after the 
uprising – Syria has become a state of 
proxy war: global superpowers support 
opposing sides that align most closely 
with their interests. Primarily, the 
protesting groups have entrenched 
themselves in the northwest along the 
Turkish border and in the southwest 
along the Israeli border. Assad’s forces occupy the area in the west between the rebel groups, while 
Kurdish separatists control all of the Turkish border east of the Euphrates River. The Islamic State 
(aka Da’ish) remains in control of a foothold following the Euphrates River Valley into Iraq.19 
Syria, despite its chaos, is a valuable uprising to study because of the clearly evident 
consequences of replication. The street protests, just weeks after the fall of Mubarak, were modeled 
astoundingly closely after the protests in Egypt. Beginning with tweeting youths, several of the 
revolutionary calls and demands were taken from the Egyptian movement. When children drew 
graffiti on a wall in Daraa, they used “Down with the regime,” the slogan of Egyptian Revolution. 
Syrians went so far as to rename the city center of Damascus “Tahrir Square,” after the famous 
revolutionary square of Cairo. What the protestors failed to realize was the polar opposite nature 
of the two governing structures. In Egypt, the top military officials (who eventually oversaw the 
resignation of Mubarak) were largely distanced from the President. While the President had the 
support of many deep institutions, the powerful military was somewhat independent. In Syria, 
Assad ensured a loyal military above all by coup-proofing the military and government. The 
military was organized in a way that enforced checks to the power of individual units by 
overlapping roles. In addition, almost every key military position was filled by a member of 
Assad’s extended family, who were also Alawites (the religious minority, like Assad).18 As the two 
uprisings progressed in parallel, Assad’s protection of a loyal military proved smart as the direct, 
traditional nature of the uprising worked in his favor.  
The Saltwater Theory 
Attempted political change and revolution, as seen above, are almost always inspired by 
historical precedent. While inspiration plays a role in adding value and relevance to a developing 
uprising, the distinction between inspiration and replication is an important one. Inspiration opens 
the path for actors to develop a fitting strategy for their environment; replication limits the path to 
a strategy. 
Like economics, the study of revolution is not a definitive (or absolutely empirical) science 
as it must include the human element – unpredictable acts that include randomness. Environments 
and conditions within a state can be influenced in ways that make a geopolitical prism either more 
or less conducive to revolution depending on an actor’s interaction with it, as if the possibility of 
revolution is hanging on a balance. However, no relationship between a state’s conditions and an 
actor’s behavior creates an environment where revolution is either inevitable or impossible. 
Interestingly, Che Guevara’s failure (and eventual execution) negligibly changed the paradigm of 
revolutionary theory. Academics and policymakers continued the pivot toward an actor focus, and 
continued away from a focus on a state’s environment and the likelihood of revolution. As 
Palestinians continue to advocate for political and social rights, historians wonder how the Intifada 
could have succeeded. After the massacre at Tiananmen Square, rather than dispel the notion that 
economic reform must lead to political reform, policymakers offered shallow explanations on how 
protestors somehow weren’t doing things right. Even in the post-Arab Spring world, diplomatic 
analysts theorize on the actual and potential behavior of revolutionaries rather than assessing the 
relationship between the revolutionary and their prism of influence. 
Perhaps the most important question in correctly identifying the drivers of revolution is 
why any of it matters. Most of the world probably has no interest in participating in a violent 
revolution against their government. However, massive globalization has resulted in a world in 
which there is not a single person of the seven billion on earth who is not either a part of, or 
influenced by a hegemon. Fittingly, each conflict listed had hegemonic influence. From an 
American perspective for example, while Che was fighting in Congo, the US State Department 
backed the Congolese government; while the Palestinians sabotaged and demonstrated against the 
Israelis, the Defense Department again funded the Old Regime; while the protestors rose up for 
political rights, the US quietly cheered them on in China; and when protests and skirmishes broke 
out in Syria, the American military essentially added Syrian rebels to the Pentagon’s payroll. 
Superpower and regional power influence in uprisings will not slow as the 21st century progresses. 
Most appropriately, those powers should arm themselves with the insight that revolutions are often 
attempted replications of prior successes. The aim of both states and of revolutionaries will 
increasingly focus on first identifying the differences in connections between states and actors, 
and next exploiting those differences to reject or ensure revolution, respectively. 
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